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A Temporary Solution to Climate Change:
The Federal Common Law to the Rescue?
by JEREMY HESSLER*
Many lawyers are responding to the [political] stalemate [on
climate change legislation] through litigation, following the old




In the latter half of 2009, the Second Circuit in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co. ("AEP")2 and the Fifth Circuit in
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA ("Comer")' provided a strong signal to the
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1. Michael B. Gerrard, What the Law and Lawyers Can and Cannot Do About
Global Warming, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 33, 34 (2007).
2. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009) (petition for
rehearing en banc denied Mar. 5, 2010) ("A EP") petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010)
(No. 10-174).
3. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (Comer). Comer may
indeed become best known as an appellate procedure oddity. After the initial opinion by
the Fifth Circuit reversing the district court, a majority of sitting judges voted for an en
banc hearing, thereby vacating the three-judge panel's opinion. Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). Next, an additional judge recused herself creating a
lack of quorum to actually hear the case en banc. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d
1049 (5th Cir. 2010). The remaining majority held that because the three-judge panel's
opinion was validly vacated (quorum was established at the time), the trial court's opinion
is reinstated and may be appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1054-55. Judge Dennis
dissented and found this to be an arbitrary distinction, stating that if the recently recused
judge would have become recused three months earlier, the outcome would have been the
opposite. Id. at 1055-56 (Dennis, J. dissenting). For the remainder of the note, I will
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political branches that the courts could begin regulating greenhouse
gas ("GHG") emissions under common law tort actions. However,
shortly after AEP was decided, the District Court for the Northern
District of California flatly rejected the outcome and analysis of AEP
in the case of Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobile Corp.4
In AEP, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the federal public nuisance claims of eight states, a city,
and three non-profit land trusts for the injuries allegedly caused by
the emissions of the six largest power companies in the United
States.! In Comer, the Fifth Circuit similarly dismissed the political
question doctrine as a defense to a suit for damages caused by the
increased ferocity of Hurricane Katrina in a class action suit against a
variety of Gulf Coast industrial companies under public and private
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims.' Finally, Kivalina involved
a native Inupiat village that sued twenty-four power and utility
companies for the costs necessary of relocating the residents away
from an island that allegedly would become uninhabitable due to
climate change.! Although AEP and Comer were dismissed before
the merits stage, one can infer the broad issues with which trial courts
will grapple from the appellate opinions' substantive outlines.'
discuss Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) prior to the opinion being
vacated.
4. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (Kivalina).
5. See AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (eight states, New York City, and three land trusts
sued the six largest power companies in the U.S.). The term "greenhouse gases" refers to a
group of gases that contribute to the "greenhouse effect," trapping heat in the Earth's
atmosphere and contributing to global climate change. Greenhouse gases include carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 633-36 (3d ed. 2007); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change
Litigation Through The Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701, 703
n.5 (2008).
6. Corner, 585 F.3d at 859-61 (where residents and land owners with property along
the Mississippi Gulf coast, represented by two Louisiana class action law firms, sued
sixteen national companies that produce energy, fossil fuels, and chemicals near the Gulf
Coast).
7. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
8. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
that "[b]ecause resolution of the issues presented here requires identification and
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, 'an
initial policy determination' . . . is required"); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 2007 WL
6942285, 1 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (finding that "Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims
against Defendants and that Plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable pursuant to the political
question doctrine.").
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This note focuses upon these recent developments in climate
change litigation9 by closely examining the different issues that arise
in these suits, as well as of some of the issues that may arise if the trial
courts reach the merits stage of these cases. Part I contains a brief
background of climate change. Part II examines the political question
doctrine in the context of climate change litigation. Part III analyzes
public nuisance actions and climate change. Part IV looks at the
displacement doctrine and the effect of the Environmental Protection
Agency's ("EPA") regulation of GHGs. Part V considers the
consequences of allowing similar suits to proceed and the general
issues trial courts may face. The conclusion suggests that although
many difficulties arise, climate change litigation could be a step
forward in our nation's policy of regulating pollutants that cause
climate change.
I. Background to Climate Change
To understand any law that seeks to regulate or mitigate the
effects of climate change, it is important to understand climate
change. In brief, deforestation, as well as the burning of fossil fuels
including coal and oil, have caused a significant increase in
atmospheric concentrations of heat-trapping chemical compounds
known as "greenhouse gases."'o Of these greenhouse gases, carbon
dioxide is the most significant gas because of the quantity in our
atmosphere. The current quantities of GHGs far exceed the past
natural ranges over the last 650,000 years." Climate change is a broad
9. For the purpose of this note, "climate change litigation" comprises tort actions
that seek to hold corporate defendants liable for their large-scale CO, production.
Commentators have opined an action for carbon dioxide would not differ substantially
from other non-regulated GHGs. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-
Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 61 n.23
(2003).
10. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Summary for
Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability:
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 8-9 (M.L.
Parry et al., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC 4th AR], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-reportlar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (concluding human activities are the primary
contributor to global warming). Global warming is "an average increase in the
temperature of the atmosphere near the Earth's surface and in the troposphere, which can
contribute to changes in global climate patterns." EPA, Climate Change Basic
Information, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html (last visited March 14,
2010) (describing the process of global warming).
11. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In:
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr-spm.pdf.
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term that encompasses any change in the climate that can be directly
or indirectly attributed to anthropogenic (i.e., human) activity, and
global warming is one of the most significant components of climate
change.12
Evidence of the dramatic effects of human influences on climate
change is becoming increasingly obvious and alarming. "There is now
indisputable evidence that human activities such as electricity
production and transportation are adding to the concentrations of
greenhouse gases that are already naturally present in the
atmosphere."" Compared with the recent and distant past, these
heat-trapping gases are now at record-high levels in the atmosphere.14
For example, the oceans have absorbed 50% of the CO2 released
from the burning of fossil fuels, resulting in a 30% increase of ocean
acidification and many adverse impacts on marine organisms." The
Pentagon has placed climate change as a top priority for our national
security by linking the adverse changes in regional climates, such as
flooding and droughts, to significant geopolitical impacts around the
world; these changes will contribute to "poverty, environmental
degradation, and further weakening fragile governments," as well as
lead to mass migrations due to food and water scarcity, and the
spread of diseases.
Much international and national momentum has gathered behind
the environmental movement in the last five years. For example,
Vice President Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ("IPCC") were awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for
researching and raising awareness of the potential problems
associated with climate change." Also, the countries with the largest
12. The term "climate change" in this note is used in accordance with the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, where it "refers to a change of climate that is attributed
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global
atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable
time periods." IPCC 4th AR, supra note 10, at 21 (emphasis added).
13. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ("EPA"), Climate Change Indicators 1
(2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/indicators/pdfs/Climatelndicatorsfull.pdf.
14. Id.
15. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION ("NOAA"), State
of the Science Fact Sheet: Ocean Acidification (May 2008), available at http://www.pmel.
noaa.gov/ co2/ OA/OceanAcidification%20FINAL.pdf.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEw REPORT 84-85 (Feb.
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR-as-of_12Febl0_1000.pdf.
17. The Nobel Committee awarded the prize to the IPCC and Gore "for their efforts
to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to
lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change." The
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GHG emissions signed the Copenhagen Accord, which acknowledges
that climate change is "one of the greatest challenges of our time.""
For the most part, the attitudes of scholars, scientists, government
officials, and business leaders have largely shifted from doubting the
very existence of climate change to now recognizing it is occurring at
a rapid pace."
However, the environmental movement has recently endured
two controversies. In the first, emails from a climate scientist at the
University of East Anglia revealed contempt for scientific papers that
dispute climate change,20 but he was later cleared of any wrongdoing.2 1
Second, in its most recent report, the IPCC made two errors due to
incorrect data.22 Despite these setbacks, which are further discussed
in Part IV, the recent actions by the federal government are
encouraging. For example, the EPA and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") issued a joint Final Rule
that set stricter fuel economy standards for vehicles and thereby
reduce the GHGs emitted by vehicles pursuant to the Clean Air Act
Norwegian Nobel Committee, Press Release for the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize (Oct. 2007)
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peacellaureates/2007/press.html. The IPCC is a United
Nations network of scientists charged with providing "a clear scientific view on the current
state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
consequences." IPCC, Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm
(last visited March 13, 2010).
18. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord
of 18 December 2009 (2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/
application/ pdf/copl5_cph-auv.pdf.
19. See generally Al Gore, Op-Ed: We Can't Wish Away Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/28gore.html (stating
"there have been impressive efforts by many business leaders, hundreds of millions of
individuals and families throughout the world and many national, regional and local
governments"); William Stevens, On the Climate Change Beat, Doubt Gives Way to
Certainty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at F1 (reflecting on cultural attitudes toward climate
change over the last decade and discussing recent research on certainty of climate change).
20. Lauren Morello, 'Climategate' Scientist Admits 'Awful E-Mails,' but Peers Say
IPCC Conclusions Remain Sound, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/02/02climatewire-climategate-scientist-admits-
awful-e-mails-b-66224.html?scp=1&sq=east%20anglia&st=cse.
21. BBC News, 'No Malpractice' by Climate Unit (April 14, 2010), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilscience/nature/8618024.stm.
22. The IPCC "published a flawed overestimate of the melting rate of debris-covered
glaciers in the Himalayas, and used information about the Netherlands provided to it by
the government, which was later found to be partly inaccurate." Gore, supra note 19; see
also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Skeptics Find Fault with U.N. Climate Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
8, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/science/earthl09climate.html.
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("CAA").2 Additionally, EPA recently promulgated two new rules:
the first will mandate all stationary sources that emit substantial
GHG emissions to report their emissions, while the second rule will
require a permit issued under the CAA for GHG emissions emitted
by select stationary sources.24 Both of these new rules will take effect
by January 2, 2011.25
H. Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question
Doctrine
A. Background
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court formulated the modern
understanding of the political question doctrine.26 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, outlined six factors that indicate a
controversy is non-justiciable: "Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found":
(1) A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
(2) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or
(3) The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
(4) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
23. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324,
25328 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85-86, 600) (vehicle GHG emission
regulation).
24. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,260, 56,264 (Oct. 3,
2009) (to be codified reporting requirement); 74 Fed. Reg. at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86-90, 94, 98,
1033,1039,1042,1045,1048,1051,1054,1065); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. Ch. I); Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52, 70-71) (requiring permits for select stationary sources).
25. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,264; 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497; 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,514.
26. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-19 (1962).
27. Id. at 217.
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A mixture of constitutional and prudential concerns, any of these six
factors "exclude[] from judicial review those controversies which
revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch."' Baker makes clear that not
every matter touching on politics is a political question." Instead, a
political question involves a policy decision which the "[j]udiciary is
particularly ill suited to make ... [since] courts are fundamentally
underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards
for matters not legal in nature."
B. Connecticut v. AEP
On September 15, 2005, Judge Loretta Preska of the Southern
District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' claim under the federal
common law to abate "the public nuisance of global warming."3  The
District Court stated it could not even consider the standing analysis
since merely analyzing the issue would require the court to "make
judgments that could have an impact on the other branches'
responses to what is plainly a political question."3 2 Unsurprisingly,
the District Court found an initial policy determination would be
required if the requested injunctive relief were granted.3 ' The court
cited some of the impermissible "policy determinations" such as
determining the appropriate level to cap CO2 emissions, the rate at
which to implement these reductions, and assessing the available
alternative energy resources.' Judge Preska is not alone; every
district court has so far found a hearing on the merits requires an
initial policy determination.
28. Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
29. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
30. Japan Whaling Ass'n., 478 U.S. at 230 (internal quotations omitted) (citation
omitted).
31. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (internal quotation
omitted).
32. Id. at 271.
33. Id. at 274.
34. Id. at 272-73.
35. Id. at 274; Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1066645 (S.D. Miss.
2006); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Kivalina, 663
F. Supp. 2d 863, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
413
In AEP, a unanimous two judge panel 6 of the Second Circuit
reversed the District Court.37 The appellate court found that under
the first Baker factor, reducing defendants' sizable GHG emissions
implicated foreign policy, the relief sought only applies in "the most
tangential and attenuated way to the expansive domestic and foreign
policy issues."" Furthermore, the court found judicially discoverable
and manageable standards, under the second Baker factor, because
past federal public nuisance actions have addressed environmental
issues,39 and there exist clear standards in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts ("Restatement")." Under the third Baker factor, i.e.,
whether an initial policy determination is required, the court relied
upon Milwaukee I for the principle that if current statutes do not
provide a remedy to an injury caused by a public nuisance, a plaintiff
is free to bring a claim under a theory of federal nuisance.4
Therefore, the court concluded that this "ordinary tort suit" does not
require an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.42
C. Comer v. Murphy Oil
In Comer, plaintiffs filed a class action suit, based on diversity
jurisdiction, for damages under Mississippi state law. 3 The plaintiffs
alleged the emissions from energy, fossil fuel, and chemical industries
caused the emissions of GHGs that contributed to global warming
and in turn, caused an increase in global surface air and water
36. AEP, 582 F.3d at 313 (2nd Cir. 2009) (stating "The Honorable Sonia Sotomayor,
originally a member of the panel, was elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009.
The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the
matter.").
37. Id. at 315.
38. Id. at 325.
39. Primarily consisting of Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907);
Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri 1), 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200
U.S. 496 (1906).
40. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing remedies
available in nuisance actions by citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821B and 821C,
and explaining that nuisance actions were "the common law backbone of modern
environmental law" (citation omitted)); Nat'1 Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York,
616 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (adopting
Restatement definition of public nuisance and observing that the Restatement formulation
"encompasses the injury alleged in this case").
41. AEP, 582 F.3d at 330.
42. Id.
43. Comer, 585 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 2009).
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temperature, that increased the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina, which
destroyed plaintiffs' private property and public property useful to
them." The plaintiffs did not state a federal claim, but instead filed
an action under diversity jurisdiction seeking compensatory and
punitive damages based on Mississippi's common law actions of
public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.4
In dismissing plaintiffs' claims on political question grounds,
District Court Judge L.T. Senter Jr. did not issue a written opinion,
but instead issued his ruling from the bench stating, "[a] court is
simply ill-equipped or unequipped with the power" to address these
issues.46 The District Court held the political question doctrine
prevented adjudication of the claims presented, since it would require
an initial policy determination, e.g., the court would need to
formulate standards for "the amount of greenhouse gas emissions
that would be excessive and the scientific and policy reasons behind
those standards." 47
In Comer, a unanimous three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court, and held the plaintiffs' claims were
justiciable under the political question doctrine.48 In regards to
whether there exists a judicially cognizable standard to adjudicate the
claim, the court had little difficulty in finding that Mississippi tort law
provided "long-established standards" for adjudicating the common
law claims brought by the plaintiffs. 49 Rejecting the notion that an
initial policy determination was required,o the court reasoned that if
this erroneous premise applied, then "all typical air pollution cases
would pose nonjusticiable political questions."" Even if injunctive
relief was sought, the court held that relief may be limited or molded
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting the hearing transcript of the District Court's ruling).
46. Id. For a fuller discussion of whether a court is ill-equipped to make decisions
based on complex scientific and economic data see Section IV infra.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 874.
49. Id. at 875.
50. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("In this
case, balancing those interests, together with the other interests involved, is impossible
without an 'initial policy determination' first having been made by the elected branches to
which our system commits such policy decisions, viz., Congress and the President."); see
also Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871 at *7.
51. Comer, 585 F.3d at 877 (internal quotations omitted).
415
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for reasons of practicality, and thus there is no need or authority to
invoke the political question doctrine for such reasons.5
D. Kivalina
Kivalina, a federally recognized Alaskan Native Village, sued
twenty-four energy and utility companies for relocation costs between
$95 million and $400 million under federal public nuisance law." The
residents of the village are no longer able to live on their island since
the Arctic sea ice that protects Kivalina from winter storms has
significantly diminished due to climate change.54 Judge Sandra Brown
Armstrong stated that there are inadequate judicial standards for a
fact-finder to weigh the social benefits of energy production that
causes GHG emissions, against the risk that defendants' GHGs would
result in flooding on Kivalina's island." The court discounted the
majority's reasoning in AEP, finding the federal common law
pollution cases, namely Milwaukee I and Tennessee Copper, involved
a discrete number of polluters that could be readily identified,"
whereas when adjudicating climate change litigation, the court is
confronted with an insurmountable scale of GHG contributors and an
attenuated chain of events." Secondly, the court found an initial
policy determination is required to "delve into the task of
retroactively determining what emission limits should have been
imposed," as well as who should be held responsible for the injury,
which the court reasoned to be decisions that left to the political
branches." Kivalina currently is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.
III. The Common Law Doctrine of Public Nuisance
Early English and American nuisance cases were guided by the
maxim: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas which means "one should
use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
52. Id. at 860-61.
53. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 874-75.
56. Id. at 875.
57. Id. at 876 ("In a global warming scenario, emitted greenhouse gases combine with
other gases in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet retaining heat, which in
turn causes the ice caps to melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn causes the Arctic sea
ice to melt, which in turn allegedly renders Kivalina vulnerable to erosion and
deterioration resulting from winter storms.") (emphasis in original).
58. Id.
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another." 9 Although many historical common law public nuisances
were enacted into criminal statutes, these public nuisance offenses are
based on the concept that certain activities, whether negligent or
intentional, interfere with the interests of the community, or disrupt
the comfort or convenience of the general public, and thus should be
discontinued60
A brief history of the federal common law and pollution places
climate change litigation in context. In 1907, the United States
Supreme Court decided Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., which
implicitly created the federal common law of nuisance. 6' The Court
held that a state may use federal courts in order to receive injunctive
relief against transboundary polluters in other states, and thus created
the cause of action.62 It was wise for the Court to adopt a federal
standard to decide transboundary cases since it would be
inappropriate to adopt the law of either the source state or affected
state, and thereby inadvertently create a "race to the bottom" since
states would have an incentive to adjust its own laws to its favor." In
1972, shortly before passage of the modern Clean Water Act, Illinois
filed suit against the City of Milwaukee for an injunction to prevent
Milwaukee's sewage overflows from polluting the beaches and water
supplies in Illinois.' The United States Supreme Court remanded the
action directing the district court to use the federal common law of
59. Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo ut A lienum Non Laedas: A Basis for the State
Police Power, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 280 (1935).
60. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1000
(1966); see also PROSSER, TORTS § 89 at 605-06 (3rd ed. 1964) (finding interference with
the interests of the public in health, safety, morals, peace, comfort, convenience, thrift and
economy have been the basis for public nuisance actions).
61. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
majority relied on Tennessee Copper Co. to support state standing: "The State has an
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237).
62. Id. at 238 ("It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that
the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction
they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from
the same source.").
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. J.
931, 933, 939-46 (1997).
64. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93, 99-108 (1972).
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public nuisance." Nine years after the enactment of the modern
Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court decided the case again in
Milwaukee II.6 The Court rejected the application of federal
common law to fill the regulatory gap since the amendments to the
Clean Water Act provided adequate redress through a
comprehensive permit system for the discharge of pollutants. The
Court held the federal common law was displaced."
A majority of states have adopted the Restatement's definition
of public nuisance." The Restatement defines a public nuisance as
"an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public."69 Under this standard, the fact-finder must weigh the "the
gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.",o This test,
therefore, is highly dependent on community-based interests."
A. AEP
Although the district court did not reach the question whether
each group of plaintiffs stated a claim under public nuisance, the
appellate court thought it proper to decide this issue in the interest of
judicial economy.72 Instead of applying the state law of public
nuisance, the Second Circuit applied the federal common law of
public nuisance so as to not risk absorbing a state law as a federal law
for transboundary pollution disputes." The court found the
Restatement's definition of public nuisance provided a workable
standard for federal common law and found all plaintiffs adequately
stated a claim.74
IV. Climate Change Litigation and the Displacement Doctrine
The court in AEP held that the CAA, at the time the opinion
was issued, did not displace the court's power to provide a remedy for
damages caused by GHG emissions from stationary sources under the
65. Id. at 104.
66. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee II"), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
67. Id. at 325-26.
68. Grossman, supra note 9, at 53.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
70. Id. at cmt. e.
71. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 49 P.3d 61, 72 (N.M. 2002) (adopting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as a community-based standard).
72. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 349 (2nd Cir. 2009).
73. Id. at 351.
74. Id.
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federal common law." Ironically, Massachusetts v. EPA, one of the
most significant environmental victories in federal court, could also
be the downfall of common law nuisance suits against GHG emissions
under the doctrine of displacement.
A. The Clean Air Act
The CAA is viewed as "among the most complex regulatory
statutes in American law."" The CAA creates a regulatory scheme
that generally divides regulatory responsibility between federal and
state governments for the regulation of air pollution from mobile and
stationary sources."
The mobile source regulatory scheme provided in sections 202
and 211 of the CAA allows EPA to set federal emissions standards
for new vehicles and to regulate fuel additives." On the other hand,
stationary sources may be regulated under one or more of three
regulatory provisions. First, under sections 108 through 110 of the
CAA, EPA can set the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") for the "criteria" air pollutants that the Administrator
found to endanger public health and cause or contribute to air
pollution.7 ' The states then must maintain these federal standards
through a State Implementation Plan ("SIPs").' Second, under CAA
section 111, EPA can set new source performance standards
("NSPS") that require new and modified emissions sources to
implement specified systems for pollution control." Finally, EPA can
regulate "toxic" pollutants that are especially hazardous to human
health or the environment under section 112.8
75. Id. at 381. The court also surveyed the paltry amount of legislation from Congress
concerning GHG, and concluded: "[Our] review of the statutes cited by Defendants shows
that Congress has not acted to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in any real way.
Congress has prescribed research, reports, technology development, and monitoring,
but . . . has not enacted any legislation that 'addresses' the problem that climate change
presents to Plaintiffs." Id. at 385.
76. Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free? 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 287 (2010).
77. For an overview of the CAA, see generally THE CLEAN AIR Acr HANDBOOK
(David P. Martineau Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (emissions standards for new vehicles), § 7545 (regulation of
fuels).
79. Id. §§ 7408-7410; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 462-63
(2001).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7410
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
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In 2007, the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA, held that
EPA may permissibly regulate GHG emissions under the CAA."
The case was brought by Massachusetts and other states to compel
the Bush Administration's EPA to regulate GHG emitted from
mobile sources under section 202 of the CAA.' Although EPA
argued GHGs were not "pollutants" under the CAA, the Court
found that the Administrator could validly find GHGs to not only be
criteria pollutants within section 202, but also within the statute
generally.' However, the Court did not require that GHGs be
regulated immediately, but instead deferred to EPA to make a
finding under 202 of "endangerment," "no endangerment," or by
explaining why a definite finding would be impossible."
Following this landmark decision, EPA initiated four actions to
regulate GHG emissions:'
* First, on October 30, 2009, EPA issued a final rule requiring
specified sources emitting more than 25,000 tons of GHGs to
report those emissions to EPA."
* Second, on December 15, 2009, EPA published a final
endangerment finding that under section 202 of the CAA,
GHGs in the atmosphere may be reasonably anticipated to
endanger public health and welfare.
* Third, on May 7, 2010, EPA and the Department of
Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety
83. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
84. Id. at 504-06.
85. Id. at 528-29 (finding that "[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA's reading. The
Clean Air Act's sweeping definition of 'air pollutant' includes 'any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical ... substance or matter which
is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. . . .' § 7602(g). On its face, the
definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that
intent through the repeated use of the word 'any.' Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt 'physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s]
which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.' The statute is unambiguous.") (alteration in
original).
86. Id. at 533-35.
87. See Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority in Support of Petitioners 24-25
(2010), available at http://www.eenews.netlassets/2010/08/25/documentgw01.pdf.
88. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gasses, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,264, 56,260
(October 30, 2009) (stating that this rule "does not require control of greenhouse gases").
89. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gasses Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,497 (December 15, 2009).
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Administration published a joint final rule that will require
most vehicles covering model years 2012 through 2016 to meet
an estimated combined average emissions level of 250 grams of
C02 per mile, which can be met solely through fuel economy
improvements or a reduction of the C02 emitted by each
vehicle. 0 These standards take effect on January 2, 2011.
* Fourth, on May 13, 2010, EPA issued a final rule that tailors
the application of CAA permitting requirements for stationary
sources since the chain of regulatory events finding GHGs
pollutants for mobile sources will regulate GHGs emitted by
stationary sources.9' The so-called "Tailoring Rule" limits the
scope and timing of the permitting requirements for GHGs
under the CAA; since without this tailoring rule, the lower
emissions thresholds would automatically take effect and lead
to an insurmountable number of required permits.2 EPA will
regulate GHGs at stationary sources that seek to obtain permits
for other pollutants beginning January 2, 2011.93
B. Displacement Analysis
In AEP, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the
federal common law of nuisance was displaced by EPA's actions.
This result is primarily because at the time of the opinion (September
21, 2009), EPA had only initiated the rule-making process and
therefore was far from regulating GHGs.94 The Second Circuit found
EPA's intentions insufficient for displacement purposes: "Until EPA
completes the rulemaking process, we cannot speculate as to whether
the hypothetical regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act would in fact 'speak[] directly' to the 'particular issue' raised here
by Plaintiffs, which is otherwise governed by federal common law."5
The Second Circuit concluded that until EPA makes the requisite
90. Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,328 (May 7, 2010) (estimating "960
million metric tons and 1.8 billion barrels of oil over the lifetime of the vehicles sold under
the program (model years 2012-2016)."
91. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3,2010).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 381 (2d Cir. 2009).
95. Id. at 380 (quoting Oneida Cnty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470
U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985)).
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findings, the CAA does not "(1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or
(2) regulate such emissions from stationary sources."96
In determining whether a federal statute displaces federal
common law, the United States Supreme Court starts with "the
assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law."" The
Court has articulated the relevant inquiry as whether the statute
speaks directly to the question otherwise answered by federal
common law." Accordingly, federal common law is used as a
"necessary expedient" when Congress has not "spoken to a particular
issue."" The Court, in Milwaukee II stated, "the question is whether
the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a
particular manner."'" Therefore, if EPA's actions have regulated
GHG emissions produced by stationary sources in any way, even if
the regulatory scheme is of a different character than these climate
change lawsuits, federal common law suits regulating GHGs are
displaced.
When the Second Circuit published the opinion in AEP, EPA
was in the very early stages of this comprehensive regulatory scheme
to regulate GHG emissions.o However, now that EPA has published
the final rules, which are set to go into effect on January 2, 2011, it
will be exceedingly difficult to argue that EPA is not "thoroughly
addressing" the problem of GHGs by incrementally regulating major
sources of the United States' GHGs.0 2
The defendants in AEP have filed a petition for certiorari;
however, assuming the Court does not hear the case, the Solicitor
General's brief in favor of certiorari suggests that such a precedent
creates "an extensive roadmap for resolving several threshold
questions in favor of plaintiffs in such cases, [and that] courts in the
Second Circuit will likely host a disproportionate share of such suits,
96. Id. at 381 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1992)).
97. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Oneida Cnty., 470 U.S. at 236-37 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315) (internal
alterations omitted).
99. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313-14.
100. Id. at 324.
101. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Timeline of EPA's Endangerment
Finding, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/EndangermentFinding
.Timeline.pdf.
102. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 320
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perhaps forestalling percolation of similar issues in other circuits.""0
In light of such a dire warning, it is worth examining some of the
issues district courts would face in climate change litigation suits, as
well as whether adjudicating these claims violates the political
question doctrine.
V. Next Steps: Issues District Courts will Confront and
Possible Solutions
A. Daubert Challenges
To prove that defendants' actions are a substantial factor in
causing the injury, plaintiffs will first have to introduce foundational
scientific evidence that proves GHGs cause global warming in a
nontrivial way. This would likely hinge on expert testimony from
climate scientists. In a 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Daubert"), the Supreme Court announced a
new standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony which
positions district court judges as "gatekeepers" guarding against junk
science. Discarding the previous Frye-test of general acceptability,
the Court explained the purpose of the test is to determine whether
the scientific methodology underlying the testimony is reliable
through balancing multiple factors:
(1) Testability: "whether [the] theory or technique ... can be
(and has been) tested";
(2) Peer review: "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication";
(3) Error rate: "the court ordinarily should consider the known
or potential rate of error";
(4) Control standards: "the court ordinarily should consider ...
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation"; and
(5) General acceptance: "widespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible."10o
The Court emphasized that "the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ...
a flexible one," and thus compliance or noncompliance with any of
103. Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority in Support of Petitioners, supra note 87,
at 10.
104. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ("Daubert").
105. Id. at 593-94.
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the listed factors is not necessarily determinative of admissibility."
Each trial judge, as a gatekeeper, may make a Daubert determination
on a case-by-case basis to ensure the expert testimony is not only
relevant, but reliable.*
In a case dealing with the science of climate change, an expert
would most likely base many conclusions on the data of the IPCC.
The IPCC is a scientific body composed of thousands of scientists
from universities and research institutes from around the world."*
They work for about three years writing and reviewing a report
before publishing it, which occurs every six or seven years." The
IPCC is organized into three working groups that respectively
research the physical science, the impacts and adaptation, and the
mitigation of climate change.no Because of the wide acceptability
within the scientific community of the methodology, testability, and
peer-reviewed reports it would be difficult to exclude or limit
scientific testimony on the science or effects of climate change."'
106. Id. at 594; see also Ryan Hackney, Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change
Defendants in the Hot Seat, 40 ENVTL. L. 264 (2010).
107. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 ("The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-
ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will
eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are
probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and
binding legal judgment-often of great consequence-about a particular set of events in
the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge ... inevitably on
occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.").
108. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Structure of IPCC, http://www.ipcc.
ch/organization/organizationstructure.htm (last visited March 13, 2010).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See IPCC 4th AR: The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 3,
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf ("The
understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate has improved
since the [Third Assessment Report], leading to very high confidence that the global
average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming." (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted)); see also American Association for the Advancement of
Science, AAAS Board. Statement on Climate Change 1 (2007), available at http://
www.aaas.org/news/press-room/limate change/ mtg_200702/aaas climate statement.pdf
("The scientific evidence is clear: global climate change caused by human activities is
occurring now, and it is a growing threat to society."); The National Academies,
Understanding and Responding to Climate Change: Highlights of National Academies
Reports 2 (2008 ed. 2008), available at http://dels.nas.eduldels/rpt-briefs/climate-
change.2008_final.pdf ("Most scientists agree that the warming in recent decades has been
caused primarily by human activities that have increased the amount of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere." (citation omitted)).
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However, because of recent controversies, defendants may
challenge an expert's reliance on the IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report ("IPCC 4th AR") as unreliable based on the recent
discoveries of a flawed overestimate of the melting rate of debris-
covered glaciers in the Himalayas, as well as inaccurate climate
information concerning the Netherlands provided to the IPCC by the
country's government.112 Since only the overestimation of the glacial
melting rate can be directly attributed to the IPCC, a court may look
at this as increasing the "error rate" of the data. However, this is one
paragraph out of Working Group II's 938-page contribution to the
4th Assessment Report. It is likely to have an effect if an expert
substantially relies on this particular paragraph for the basis of her
conclusion. However, if it is not central to the testimony, then it
would be unlikely to have an effect on the admission of an expert's
testimony. Also, it is worth emphasizing that a trial judge is provided
great "flexibility" to apply the Daubert factors and view the research
holistically, which is exemplified by Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie ("Green Mountain")."'
In Green Mountain, the plaintiffs, vehicle manufacturers and
dealerships, challenged Vermont's adoption of California's stricter
tailpipe emission standard, arguing that state-enacted standards were
preempted by federal regulations.114 The defendants, the State of
Vermont and environmental non-profit interveners, called a highly-
regarded climate expert, Dr. James Hansen, who testified that
"human emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and
methane, are climate 'forcing' agents that can cause warming of the
Earth's surface.""' In its analysis, the court balanced and flexibly
applied the Daubert factors to ensure that Hansen's testimony was
reliable.
112. The relevant paragraph stated:
Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world
(see Table 10.9) and, if the present rate continues, the likelihood of them
disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps
warming at the current rate. Its total area will likely shrink from the present
500,000 to 100,000 km2 by the year 2035 (WWF, 2005).
IPCC 4th AR, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publicationsand data/ar4/wg2/en/chl0sl0-
6-2.html; see also Rosenthal, supra, note 22; Gore, supra note 19. For an apology by the
IPCC see IPCC, IPCC Statement on the Melting of Himalayan Glaciers http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdflpresentations/himalaya-statement-20january2010.pdf.
113. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295
(D. Vt. 2007).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 313.
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In addressing the plaintiffs' first challenge concerning the
testability of climate change, the court called it "ridiculous" to
exclude Hansen's testimony because it cannot be conclusively
tested."' Conclusively testing climate change would require global
temperatures to increase two to three degrees Celsius: "A prediction
[that global temperatures will rise] on this enormous scale must
necessarily be tested by the extent to which it is confirmed by
evidence such as the historical record and model results, rather than
through testing. The same would be true of a theory on global
warming offered by any expert.""' The plaintiffs called a rebuttal
witness, Dr. John Christy, to challenge Hansen's reliability and to
testify that the impact of global warming is unsupported by scientific
evidence.' The court found that the bulk of scientific opinion
opposed Christy's position, and moreover the sources Hansen relied
upon, i.e., historical temperature records, ice cores, ocean cores and
modeling results, were indeed credible.19
Next, the court examined Hansen's peer-reviewed articles and
the wide acceptance of his theories within the scientific community. 2'
Christy, the rebuttal witness, even agreed with Hansen and the IPCC
assessment that most of the warming over the last fifty years is due to
an increase of GHG concentrations caused by the burning of fossil
fuels.12' Plaintiffs also challenged Hansen's methodology as to his
estimate of the exact level of sea rise, which Hansen conceded cannot
be predicted according to any precise existing mathematical or
scientific models.12  The court found that under these circumstances,
Hansen's expertise to make general predictions based on climate
history is a reasonable choice of methodology.
Although the court accepted Hansen's testimony, the court also
concluded that Hansen's predictions do not have a known error rate
and cannot be tested, at least not in a laboratory.123 Because a trial
judge is given a large amount of discretion under Daubert, it is
conceivable that not every judge will overlook the lack of testability
and error rate as to the exact effects of climate change. Therefore,
116. Id. at 318.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 316-17.
119. Id. at 316.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 319.
122. Id. at 317.
123. Id. at 318.
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some district court judges may not find expert testimony of the
science of climate change reliable.
Green Mountain illustrates the capability of district court judges
to balance complex scientific evidence and apply the Daubert factors
holistically. The opinion's detailed analysis of each Daubert factor
and the relevance of each expert's testimony could act as a valuable
roadmap for future parties in climate change litigation.
B. Duty of Care and Proximate Cause
Public nuisance liability may be imposed if an intentional or
negligent invasion of the plaintiff's interest takes place, or if the
conduct is completely out of the ordinary, i.e., strict liability.'24 Since
the Second Circuit adopted the Restatement's definition of public
nuisance, trial courts will require that plaintiffs prove that the
defendants unreasonably interfered with a right common to the
general public.'25 In cases that also contain claims under state tort
law, such as Corner, apportioning liability could be complicated by
joint and several liability. 12 6
One commentator has argued for a strict liability standard in
assessing monetary damages for GHG emissions.12 Strict liability
would promote general deterrence, and the payment of damages
could effectively act as a "judicial carbon tax" both to provide a
financial incentive for emitters to reduce emissions and to fund
adaptation efforts by public and private entities.'" These suits would
be analogous to states recovering substantial medical costs from the
tobacco industry.129 Strict liability is imposed when a defendant's
conduct constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity."o This high
standard would be a difficult burden for plaintiffs seeing as the
production of energy is generally seen as a necessary and not
abnormally dangerous.
124. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 574 (4th ed. 1971).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1965); see also AEP, 582 F.3d
309, 363 (2nd Cir. 2009).
126. Grossman, supra note 9, at 28.
127. Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1930 (2008).
128. Id.
129. Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil
Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429,
446-47 (2005) (proposing that tobacco litigation be used as a model to pursue climate
change litigation based on products liability or nuisance).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965).
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Besides strict liability, a negligence formula, which the
Restatement leans in favor of for public nuisance, may be imposed to
assess whether a defendant breached a duty.13' A prima facie
negligence case requires four elements: duty, breach, causation, and
injury.13 2 In order to determine whether a duty is owed, a trial court
could use the "Hand Formula" in order to create a cost-benefit
analysis for reasonability.'33 As Judge Learned Hand discussed in the
context of a barge left unattended for several hours in a busy harbor,
the owner's duty depends on three variables: "(1) the probability [the
vessel] would break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if [it]
does; and (3) the burden of adequate precautions.... [I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether ... B < PL."'3 4
In this case, finding a duty would depend on the (1) probability
of injuries by the plaintiffs due to defendants' GHG emissions
contributing to the warming of earth's atmosphere, (2) the
significance of the injury, and (3) the burden of purchasing and
installing the best available control technology ("BACT") to reduce
emissions. The court would have to determine whether the cost of
BACT is less than the injuries incurred and the likelihood of injuries.
Although this scenario is much more complex than an unmanned
barge floating through a busy harbor, both scenarios basically require
a value judgment despite the appearance of an objective algebraic
formula. How much value should be placed on the significance and
probability of the injury versus the burden on defendant to mitigate
or prevent it? Some view the Hand Formula as benefiting climate
change plaintiffs:
[T]he probability (and thus foreseeability) of specific damage
caused by climate change is increasingly being documented.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1965) (stating "[t]he
defendant is held liable for a public nuisance if his interference with the public right was
intentional or was unintentional and otherwise actionable under the principles controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities.").
132. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and
the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 657, 658 & n.1, 659 & nn.3-5
(2001) (citing case law, treatises, and casebooks).
133. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned
Hand, J.) (explaining the formula in which balancing the probability of harm (P), the cost
of harm (L), and the burden of taking precautions to prevent harm (B) imposes liability if
B < PL.); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 180--82 (5th ed.
1998).
134. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
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This will not only allow for stronger arguments on causation but
will also satisfy two prongs of the [Hand] formula-the
probability of harm (P) and the severity of the harm (L)-and,
thus, will strengthen plaintiffs' cases for a breach of the duty of
reasonable care.
Moreover, reducing GHG emissions is becoming less of a cost
burden; solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, and biofuel alternatives
have become less expensive because of technological advances and
high development interest.' The trend is toward a reduction in
GHG emissions, which will favor efforts to reduce the harms caused
by the emissions of defendants. Tests that balance societal benefits
and harms, such as the Hand Formula, are common tasks for the
judiciary, and most likely led the courts in AEP and Comer to classify
the climate change lawsuits as "ordinary tort suits" that do not
require an "initial policy determination" under the political question
doctrine.37
Expert testimony will likely play a key role in assisting fact-
finders to determine the standard of care to which defendants should
be held. Plaintiffs' experts would likely attest to the conclusion that
GHG emissions caused the injury, as stated in the IPCC reports.38
The defendant corporations will likely introduce evidence as to the
large financial burden of installing BACT and the fact that this cost
will be passed on to consumers. Under the Hand Formula, the fact-
finder must decide if the defendants' cost of mitigation measures,
such as BACT, is lower than the probability and severity of the
effects of climate change on public entities and land trusts.
While there is an abundance of scientific evidence concerning the
sources and effects of climate change, proximate cause will likely be
the most significant hurdle for the plaintiffs. The Restatement
requires that the alleged negligent conduct must be a "substantial
135. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1762 (2007).
136. Rebecca Smith, The New Math of Alternative Energy, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Feb. 12, 2007, at R1; John Carey et al., Alternate Power: A Change Is in the
Wind, BUSINESS WEEK, July 4,2005, at 36-37.
137. AEP, 582 F.3d at 330 (2nd Cir. 2009); Corner, 585 F.3d at 873 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 560 (5th Cir. 2008)).
138. The IPCC uses the following terms to indicate the corresponding likelihood:
"Virtually certain" > 99% probability of occurrence, "Extremely likely" > 95%, "Very
likely" > 90%, "Likely" > 66%, "More likely than not" > 50%, "Unlikely" < 33%, "Very
unlikely" < 10%, "Extremely unlikely" < 5%. IPCC, AR 4th, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publicationsanddata/ar4/wgl/en/spmsspm-human-and.html.
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factor" in bringing about the harm to satisfy the proximate cause
prong.'" Specifically in the case of multiple contributions, the
Restatement states that when "a person is only one of several persons
participating in carrying on an activity, his participation must be
substantial before he can be held liable for the harm resulting from
it."14 0 Plaintiffs will have to prove defendants' GHG emissions were a
"substantial" cause in bringing adverse changes in the climate that
resulted in injuries to the plaintiffs.
The range of interpretations from courts is evident from the
"fairly traceable" standing analysis of AEP and Kivalina. In AEP,
the court held that plaintiffs were not required to "pinpoint" the
specific harms of their injuries, rather it was sufficient to simply allege
defendants' emissions "contributed" to their injuries.141 On the other
hand, the court in Kivalina rejected the AEP court's standing analysis
partly because the sources of GHG emissions were
"undifferentiated"; additionally, the harmful gases were untraceable
and they rapidly mix "with the accumulation of emissions in
California and the rest of the world."'42 Furthermore, in the
concurring opinion in Comer, Judge Eugene Davis stated that the
plaintiffs satisfied the "fairly traceable" standing requirement, but
would affirm the district court's dismissal on the alternate grounds of
proximate cause.143 This concurrence illustrates the heightened
standard and the difficulty of proving a defendant's GHG emissions
were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.'44
Using Kivalina to illustrate the hurdles involved in proving
proximate cause, future plaintiffs would need to prove that (1)
defendants' emitted GHGs, (2) these GHGs combined with other
gases in the atmosphere that resulted in the planet retaining heat, (3)
which caused ice caps to melt and sea level to rise, (4) which also
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a)
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. e.
141. AEP, 582 F.3d at 347.
142. Kivalina, 663 F.Supp. 2d at 880 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
143. Comer, 585 F.3d at 880 (5th Cir. 2009) (Davis, J. concurring).
144. Id. at 864 ("[For standing purposes] an indirect causal relationship will suffice, so
long as there is 'a fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the
alleged conduct of the defendant."') (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555
F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) (holding
that the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury is not equivalent to the fairly traceable
standard for standing purposes); Friends for Ferrell Parkway v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 324
(4th Cir. 2002) ("The 'fairly traceable' standard is 'not equivalent to a requirement of tort
causation."').
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caused the Arctic sea ice to melt, (5) and that Kivalina became
vulnerable to erosion and significant deterioration resulting from
winter storms.145 This lengthy causation chain provides judges with
ample discretion over what is considered "substantial." For example,
should the substantiality of the GHG emissions from the twenty-four
power and utility companies in Kivalina be measured against the total
GHG emissions of the United States, or globally? A court could
satisfy both criteria (substantial percentage of domestic and global
emissions) if the court found defendants' GHG emissions comprise a
substantial portion of GHG emissions in the United States (greater
than 50%), and then compare the total GHG emissions of the United
States with every other country (currently, the U.S. is the second
largest emitter of GHGs).46 In other words, the defendants'
emissions are a substantial portion of US emissions, and in turn, U.S.
emissions are a substantial portion of global emissions.
Defendants would likely counter that their GHG emissions are
not substantial under the Restatement in relation to the more than 38
gigatonnes of total global GHG emissions.'47 In light of their
contribution to global emissions, the defendants would likely argue
that holding them liable under the "substantial cause" prong of
proximate cause would be akin to tossing a match into a forest fire.4 8
The standing analysis used by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v.
EPA may be a useful foundation for assessing proximate cause since
the Court found "EPA's refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions
'contributes' to Massachusetts' injuries [of coastal erosion],"l 49 despite
the GHG emissions at issue being "a fraction of 4 percent of global
emissions," according to the dissent."' Therefore, even less than a
four percent contribution of GHG emissions (a match compared to
the other 96% of global sources) is significant for standing purposes,
and also encourages a plaintiff to cast a wide net for defendants who
145. Kivalina, 663 F.Supp. 2d at 875.
146. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Fossil-Fuel C02 Emissions by
Nation, available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre-coun.html (U.S. CO2 emissions
resulting from fossil fuels have only recently been surpassed by China, making the US the
second largest emitter).
147. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis
Report, 4th Assessment Report 36 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
148. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
149. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007) (quoting the Clean Air Act).
150. Id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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are major polluters. Mass v. EPA allows plaintiffs to fairly trace
injuries to a meager contribution, which at least opens the door for a
court to find proximate cause, despite being a tougher standard.
C. Fashioning a Workable Remedy
A key component of Kivalina and AEP's analyses under the
political question doctrine is whether the remedy sought could be
judicially manageable and not involve an initial policy
determination."' The district court in Kivalina found that "regardless
of the relief sought, the [c]ourt is left to make an initial decision as to
what is unreasonable in the context of carbon dioxide emissions."'52
Conversely, in Koohi v. United States the Ninth Circuit held that
the political question doctrine did not bar a suit involving a United
States warship that shot down a civilian aircraft, despite the fact that
the incident occurred during a military action."' The court noted that
a "key element" of its decision was the fact that the plaintiffs' suit
sought only damages.154 The court explained that "[d]amage actions
are particularly judicially manageable. However, the framing of
injunctive relief may require the courts to engage in the type of
operational decision-making beyond their competence, which is
constitutionally committed to other branches, and therefore such suits
are far more likely to implicate political questions."' Courts are
hesitant if a claim implicates the operational decision-making of the
political branches and violates the political question doctrine.'56
As the Kivalina court stated in deciding whether there exists a
manageable standard, "instead of focusing on the logistical obstacles,
the relevant inquiry is whether the judiciary is granting relief in a
reasoned fashion versus allowing the claims to proceed such that they
151. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874-78 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
152. Id. at 876 (quoting California v. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871 at *8).
153. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
154. Id. at 1332.
155. Id.
156. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (finding that the court could not
manage the manner in which the National Guard was equipped or trained); Aktepe v.
U.S., 105 F.3d 1400, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997) (wrongful death claims arising out of a NATO
training exercise raised nonjusticiable political questions in part because a decision would
require "a policy determination regarding the necessity of simulating actual battle
conditions"). See also Shawn M. LaTourette, Global Climate Change: A Political
Question? 40 RUTGERS L.J. 219, 248 (2008) ("Decisions as to the use of military power are
a quintessential example of operational decision making.").
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merely provide hope without a substantive legal basis for a ruling."5
Accordingly, the manner in which the court grants relief is a foremost
concern; it must incorporate a manageable standard that is firmly
rooted in a "substantive legal basis," as well as avoid making an initial
policy determination.
1. Monetary Relief
The Restatement distinguishes between the two remedies for
public nuisance:
[An award of damages is retroactive, applying to past conduct,
while an injunction applies only to the future.... [F]or damages
to be awarded[,] significant harm must have been actually
incurred, while for an injunction[,] harm need only be
threatened and need not actually have been sustained at all.
In determining whether to award damages in a public nuisance suit is
intrusive for defendants, "the court's task is to decide whether it is
unreasonable to engage in the conduct without paying for the harm
done."" 9 Although many courts have found a remedy for damages
less intrusive for defendants and generally more manageable to
design," the court in Kivalina nonetheless found that in order to
award damages, an aggregate level for past GHG emissions must be
set to determine whether defendants' past conduct violated a
reasonable standard."' The Kivalina court's trepidation of allowing a
fact-finder to balance the social utility of Defendants' GHG emissions
with the harm it has inflicted on Kivalina illustrates the tremendous
power of "community based standards" used in nuisance actions.12
Perhaps the court is unwilling to allow a fact-finder the possibility of
157. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Alperin v. Vatican
Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. i.
159. Grossman, supra, note 9, at 58 (quoting Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291
(5th Cir. 2001)).
160. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1332 ("Damage actions are particularly judicially
manageable."); see also Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public
Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1839 (2008).
161. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (Finding that the process of balancing the social
utility with the harm "entails a determination of what would have been an acceptable limit
on the level of greenhouse gases emitted by Defendants.")
162. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 132 N.M. 382 (2002) (holding that the balancing
of the factors for public nuisance imposes a test that is highly dependent on community-
based interests for nuisance actions).
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balancing the defendants' decisions to forego BACT mitigation or
investment in alternative energy for the many years since the effects
of climate change were foreseeable to a reasonably prudent person.
The purposes of tort law are to deter, compensate, and regulate
behavior to create an acceptable social order that substitutes legal
process for self-help.163 In accordance with these principles, a fact-
finder may one day weigh whether defendants should continue this
conduct "without paying for the harm done" to those who are injured
by defendants' GHG emissions.
2. Injunctive Relief
Claims for injunctive relief in the pollution arena are not
inherently unmanageable or certain to result in an initial policy
determination by the court, but as the District Courts' unanimous
holdings demonstrate, such claims run a fine line between policy and
adjudication." Injunctive relief is forward-looking since it requires a
threat that is sufficiently serious and imminent."' Accordingly, this
remedy could avoid some of the more difficult questions of proving
sufficient injury at the time of trial, but instead requires a showing of
likely future injuries.
As discussed earlier, injunctions run a greater risk compared to
damages of violating the political question doctrine through
"operational decision-making," i.e., decision-making beyond the
judiciary's competence and is constitutionally committed to other
branches." An injunction in a public nuisance case is appropriate
when the defendant's activity is so unreasonable that it must be
stopped.16 1 In distinguishing between damages and injunctive relief,
one can easily imagine the hypothetical corporate defendant balking
163. Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp. of Wyoming, 71 P.3d 717, 739 (Wyo. 2003);
Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mass. 1949); Grossman, supra, note 9, at 58
(quoting Cox, 256 F.3d at 291.
164. The district courts have unanimously held climate change litigation will result in
an initial policy decision by the courts: Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265,
274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1066645 (S.D. Miss.
2006). See also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. b (1979).
166. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1332.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. i (1979); see also Grossman,
supra, note 9, at 58.
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at court-mandated technology as impossible to implement and
maintain compared to a monetary payment. '
Courts have balanced the line between an initial policy
determination and valid injunctive relief in many situations. A clear
example of operational decision-making occurred shortly after the
Kent State controversy, when students brought a suit for injunctive
relief against the Governor of Ohio "to restrain him in the future
from prematurely ordering National Guard troops to duty in civil
disorders and an injunction to restrain leaders of the National Guard
from future violation of the students' constitutional rights."'69 The
United States Supreme Court held that a court may not permissibly
prescribe and regulate the training and weaponry of the National
Guard, thus resulting in an initial policy determination without any
judicially discoverable and manageable standards. 70
On the other hand, in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, after petitioning EPA to take action against a
number of power plants in neighboring states, North Carolina
successfully brought a public nuisance suit against the Tennessee
Valley Authority ("TVA")."' The court held TVA liable on the
following grounds:
TVA's generation of power at low cost to the consuming public
has a high social utility. Nonetheless, the vast extent of the
harms caused in North Carolina by the secondary pollutants
emitted by these plants outweighs any utility that may exist
from leaving their pollution untreated. ... As with the Widows
Creek plant in Alabama, TVA's failure to speedily install
readily available pollution control technology is not, and has
not been, reasonable conduct under the circumstances. 72
For these reasons, the court imposed an injunction requiring TVA to
install and continually monitor the use of appropriate pollution
168. Grossman, supra note 9, at 58. See also Lord Cairns' Act (Chancery Amendment
Act), 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27 (Eng.) (enabling courts of equity to grant personal
judgments for money damages in lieu of injunctions).
169. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3 (1973).
170. Id. at 8.




control technology. Importantly, the court rested its authority for
such actions on the common law. 74
Enjoining energy companies from all GHG emissions would
likely impose an unachievable cost of compliance.'7 ' However, due to
the scope of injury and irreparable harm, a trial court could mirror
the Hand Formula and follow the court in North Carolina in deciding
what BACT is feasible for defendants to ratchet down their emissions
to an acceptable level to the community.'76  Instead of requiring
monetary compensation, a court could similarly require the BACT to
be installed to mitigate future injuries. Thus a court could focus
directly on the source of emissions and mandate conservation and
efficiency measures, as well as technology improvements to reduce
the emissions of the source.
Conclusion
The court in AEP has laid the foundation for states, cities, and
non-profits to bring suits that regulate GHG through the doctrine of
public nuisance, which could result in significant reductions of GHGs
through injunctions, or require the payment of damages for the harm
caused by their emissions. Although the court in AEP found that an
initial policy determination is not required under the political
question doctrine, in order for these claims to survive, courts will
need to find that the actions are not displaced by EPA's recent
activity. Trial courts must also determine that a duty and proximate
causation exist, which would likely involve Daubert challenges to
climate change experts.
If displacement is not an issue, AEP and Comer have found that
ad hoc reductions and compensation could act as a temporary
solution in reducing GHG emissions in the United States. Through
the Hand Formula, a court can ask the same question we as a nation
173. Id.
174. Id. at 816 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1982)).
175. Enjoining the companies from emitting further pollution is available to a court.
See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (enjoining private defendant
from discharging noxious gas).
176. Courts have ordered the installation of technology through injunctive relief. See
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 831; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (The court appointed a
Special Master to assist in the implementation of a permanent injunction requiring the
defendant to install filtering technology on its peer-to-peer file-sharing software to prevent
unauthorized distribution of plaintiff's copyrighted works.).
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are asking ourselves: Is the cost of emitting large quantities of GHG
emissions worth the cost of injury to our society and the mitigation
measures required to adapt to the rapidly changing world?
Although courts may be able to fill a gap on this ad hoc basis,
both environmentalists and industry GHG emitters are not fond of
this solution. Most environmentalists would likely prefer a
nationwide regulatory scheme, while most industry with stationary
sources would likely prefer predictability as to the compliance
standards that must be met to control their liability. The fear of
unpredictability is exemplified by insurance companies that provide
insurance coverage to energy companies, which would cover a
possible award of damages against the company."' Steadfast
Insurance Co. has filed a suit in Virginia state court seeking a
determination of "no coverage" for AES Corp., one of the defendants
in Kivalina."' Although Kivalina was dismissed at the trial level, it
has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and may indeed follow a
similar path as that of AEP. This possibility worries the energy
industry."' Swiss Re, a major insurer, has warned, "climate change-
related litigation could become a significant issue within the next
couple of years."'s
Another factor that industry defendants should fear is the
broadening of the field of potential plaintiffs. Although traditional
environmental suits are primarily brought by environmental
organizations or states, but as evidenced by the tort attorneys in
Comer, the range of possible plaintiffs who have already been or
could be injured by climate change is vast."' If these suits are not
displaced, it is likely climate change litigation could model tobacco
litigation. The tobacco litigation model consisted of tobacco
companies successfully defending torts suits for decades, then finally
177. Sally Roberts, More Public Nuisance Suits Could Arise from Recent Court
Decisions, Bus. INSURANCE (Nov. 23, 2009).
178. A copy of the Steadfast Insurance Co. v. AES Corp. complaint filed in Virginia
circuit court can be found at http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/uploads/file/AES%
20Complaint.pdf.
179. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (plaintiffs seek $95 million to $400
million for relocation expenses).
180. Rachel Morris, The People v. CO,, SLATE, Apr. 20, 2010, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2251153 (last visited May 14, 2010).
181. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 84-85 (Feb.
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDRas-of_12FeblO 1000.pdf.
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succumbing to large settlements and eventually federal regulation.'2
In these suits, a tremendous amount of evidence of the tobacco
industry's willful deception and knowledge of the harmful effects of
tobacco came to light, which helped sway the public of the necessity
of legislation to curb the "dishonest" tobacco companies." One
commentator has stated, "realistically, the greatest function of
litigation may be to prod legislative action."m8
EPA now has finalized rules that will begin to incrementally
regulate the GHG emissions of vehicles and stationary source
emitters under the CAA, which will likely displace these climate
change suits. The AEP court seemingly invites the political branches
to displace these temporary solutions to climate change."' Also, these
suits may serve the purpose of bringing industry to the table for
comprehensive climate change legislation, especially if these suits are
held not to be displaced by EPA's actions, which will continue to
move forward toward stricter regulation. Although temporary, the
judiciary is providing a much needed push forward towards a better
and more permanent solution to climate change.
182. Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and
Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 897; Legislative Analyst's Office, The Tobacco
Settlement: What Will It Mean for California (Jan. 14, 1999), available at http://www.lao.
ca.gov/1999/011499_tobacco_settlement.pdf; The Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act, 123 STAT. 1778 (2009).
183. See Laura Maggi, Bearing Witness for Tobacco, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
November, 2002, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=bearing-witness-
for-tobacco.
184. Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1605, 1649 (2007).
185. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2nd Cir. 2009).
438 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:2
